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Abstract 
 
In this paper I investigate institutional ownership and trading across the supply 
chain. I find that institutions are more likely to own stock in a supplier firm, if they own 
stock in an economically linked customer firm. Institutions with stock in a pair of 
customer-supplier linked firms (i.e. joint owners) experience abnormal trading profits in 
supplier stocks. The magnitude of trading profits increases when institutions own a larger 
stake in the customer and when the supplier relies upon a concentrated customer base for 
sales revenue. Furthermore, I document that joint owner trading predicts unexpected 
earnings news, consistent with these institutional investors extracting material 
information from economic relationships. The results show that the supply chain is a rich 
source of information through which some skilled traders can forecast firm fundamentals 
and realize trading profits. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Business relationships across the supply chain have important financial 
implications for both customer and supplier firms. In particular, significant trading bonds 
between a customer and supplier firm-pair are likely to engender economies of scale in 
the production and delivery process. The interconnected nature of such relationships also 
exposes customer and supplier firms to common economic shocks (Menzly and Ozbas, 
2010; Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Pandit, Wasley and Zach, 2011). While the importance 
of such relationships have been acknowledged by market participants
1
, recent research 
suggests that value-relevant observable information for customer firms is only slowly 
impounded into the stock prices of linked suppliers. Cohen and Frazzini (2008), for 
example, document predictable and economically large abnormal returns in supplier 
companies following shocks to the customer. Of particular importance in this setting is 
whether certain market participants are able to capitalize on the benefit of these 
informational inefficiencies. 
 Recent research suggests that both corporate insiders and sell-side analysts 
incorporate supply chain information in their trading and earnings estimates (Alldredge 
and Cicero, 2014; Guan, Wong, and Zhang, 2014). In particular, Guan, Wong, and Zhang 
(2014) find that sell-side analysts covering both firms in a customer-supplier relationship 
                                                 
 
1For example, following news hype about the new iPhone 6, the stock prices of Apple’s component 
suppliers soared in anticipation that Apple sales would positively impact future supply firm profits. See 
Reuters July 6, 2014 news article: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/07/apple-investors-taiwan-
idUSL4N0PE1F920140707 
2  
are able to improve their earnings forecast accuracy of supplier firms significantly more 
than analysts who only cover the supplier. The implications of these findings are that the 
complexity of customer-supplier relationships prevent market participants who are not 
intimately familiar with a firm’s customer from impounding value-relevant information 
into the supplier. I extend this line of analysis to consider whether other market 
participants – institutional investors –capitalize on supply-chain information through their 
trading activity.
2
 
 Institutional investors are often viewed as informed market participants and their 
ability to capture abnormal returns has important implications for market efficiency 
proponents. As such, my paper contributes to several strands of extant finance research. 
First, I contribute to the literature on the determinants of institutional investor ownership 
(Gompers and Metrick, 1998; Sias, 2004; Yan and Zhang, 2009) by showing that 
institutional investors are significantly more likely to own a supplier firm if they already 
own a stake in the firm’s customer (hereafter I refer to ownership by a single institution 
in a customer-supplier linked firm relationship as joint ownership). Second, I contribute 
to the literature on the informativeness of institutional trade (Chen, Jegadeesh and 
Wermers, 2000; Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng, 2005; Alexander, Cici and Gibson, 2007; 
and Puckett and Yan, 2011) by showing institutional trading in supply firm stocks 
forecasts economically large abnormal returns. Conditioning on joint ownership, I find 
                                                 
 
2
 Huang and Kale (2013) find some evidence that mutual funds that invest in customer and supplier linked 
industries have superior performance, consistent with the industry-level informational advantage identified 
by Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005). In Section III C I test whether institutional trading profits in this 
study can be attributed to industry-level information, and provide evidence inconsistent with this 
alternative hypothesis.   
3  
that supplier firms most heavily purchased by institutions outperform supplier stocks 
most heavily sold by institutions by approximately 1% per month in the quarter following 
portfolio formation. The magnitude of abnormal returns is increasing in the institution’s 
percentage ownership in the customer and the strength of the customer-supplier bond. 
Finally, I add to the argument that institutions are able to anticipate otherwise unexpected 
shocks to future earnings news (Baker, Litov, Wachter and Wurgler, 2010; Yan and 
Zhang, 2009; and Ali, Durtschi, Lev and Trombley, 2004). I find that joint owner trading 
is five times more predictive of upcoming earnings surprises than short-term institutional 
traders identified by Yan and Zhang (2009). Baker, Litov, Wachter and Wurgler (2010) 
find that institutional trading skill is in part a function of institutions’ ability to forecast 
earnings news. This study identifies that the institutions’ ability to extract material 
information from the supply chain is a channel through which they can forecast earnings-
related fundamentals.  
I collect information on customer-supplier relationships over the period from 
1986 to 2010 from the Compustat Customer Segments database and institutional 
ownership from 13F filings obtained by Thompson Financial. I operationalize the concept 
of investor attention by looking separately at institutions who own the customer stock and 
institutions that do not. My metric is consistent with that employed by Guan, Wong, and 
Zhang (2014) and relies on the supposition that institutions that own a stock are 
intimately more familiar with the nuances of its business than those that do not. I propose 
that an intimate understanding of a customer firm allows an institutional investor to more 
efficiently understand the financial intricacies of the firm’s suppliers.  
4  
Given the economies of scale and scope in information acquisition, I posit that 
institutions that own shares in a customer firm are significantly more likely to own shares 
in that firms’ supplier. My findings unambiguously support the hypothesis that supply 
chain linkages are an important determinant of institutional ownership. Univariate 
analyses show that institutions that own a customer’s stock are 4.28 times more likely to 
also own stock in the corresponding supplier. While untabulated multivariate analyses 
confirm these findings, I also employ a difference-in-differences approach in order to 
alleviate concerns of endogeneity. Specifically, I explore changes in both the breadth and 
depth of institutional ownership around new sales relationships between a customer and 
supplier. My regression estimates suggest that institutions that own a customer firm are 
significantly more likely to initiate ownership in the linked supplier firm after a sales 
relationship is consummated, relative to institutions that do not own shares in the 
customer firm. Institutions that already have an ownership stake in the customer-supplier 
linked pair are also more likely to increase supplier ownership after a sales relationship 
begins. My results are consistent with economies of scale in information gathering and 
processing and information complementarities across linked pairs of customer-supplier 
firms.  
I then test whether institutional investors attain economic rents in their trading 
activities as a result of these informational complementarities. In a rational equilibrium 
framework, revealed information by customer firms that contain value-relevant pricing 
information for a firm’s supplier should be immediately impounded in supply-firm asset 
prices. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) hypothesize that capacity constraints on investor 
5  
attention provide a market friction that allows for slow incorporation of this relevant 
information into supply-firm asset prices. If the underlying mechanism proposed by 
Cohen and Frazzini (2008) is correct, one should expect that attentive market participants 
are able to capitalize on the documented slow diffusion of information and capture 
appropriate economic rents. Alternatively, if other limits to arbitrage (e.g. liquidity or 
short sale constraints) drive this documented market inefficiency, one would not expect 
attentive institutional investors to capitalize on the documented anomaly. 
My analysis of abnormal trading returns begins using calendar-time long-short 
portfolios. I aggregate changes in quarterly holdings (i.e. institutional trades) for all 
supplier firms across institutions in the sample and divide supplier firms into quartile 
portfolios by trade imbalance. I follow the value- and equal-weighted performance of 
supply firm portfolios over the adjacent quarter. For aggregate changes across all 
institutions, I find modest evidence that the quartile of suppliers most heavily bought 
outperforms the portfolio of suppliers most heavily sold during the adjacent quarter. Such 
findings suggest that, in aggregate, institutions are able to capture the benefit of 
informational complementarities across the supply chain. However, it is possible that the 
nuanced information flow is captured by a subset of institutions and the profitable trading 
observed in the aggregate sample is driven by those institutions intimately familiar with 
supply chain information.  
In order to test this possibility, I divide institutional investors in each quarter into 
two groups: 1) institutions that own the corresponding customer-firm stock, and 2) 
institutions that do not own the corresponding customer-firm stock, and repeat the trading 
6  
experiment. For institutions that own the customer-firm stock, the portfolio of supplier 
firms most heavily purchased outperforms the portfolio of supplier firms most heavily 
sold by 1.08 % (0.73%) per month using value-weighted (equal-weighted) averages. The 
second group of institutions (those who do not own customer-firm stock) represent a 
natural counterfactual example, since any public value signal can also be observed by this 
set of institutions. Results for the second sample reveal that the portfolio of supplier 
stocks most heavily bought do not outperform the portfolio of supplier stocks most 
heavily sold. My findings provide unique insight into institutional trading profits. 
Specifically, I identify a setting in which institutions are able to exploit informational 
inefficiencies by extracting information from the complex economic relationship between 
customer and supplier firms. 
If joint ownership is the mechanism that facilitates institutions’ information 
advantage, I posit that institutions with a greater familiarity of the customer-supplier 
relationship should be better equipped to obtain and process value-relevant information. I 
consider the institutions’ level of ownership in customer firms as a proxy for the 
institutions’ familiarity with the customer-supplier relationship. I repeat my calendar-time 
portfolio analysis by partitioning the joint owner trading sample into joint owners with 
above median customer stock holdings and those with below median customer stock 
holdings. For joint owners with above median customer stock holdings, the portfolio of 
supplier stocks most heavily purchased outperforms the portfolio of supplier stocks most 
heavily sold by 1.14% (0.99%) per month in the quarter following portfolio formation 
when using value-weighted (equal-weighted) averages. These abnormal portfolio returns 
7  
are consistent with joint owner institutions that have a higher ownership stake in the 
customer being more acutely aware of the customer firm’s performance and its impact on 
the linked supplier firm. 
If familiarity with the supply chain yields valuable information about future 
supplier firm performance, then supply chain characteristics such as the strength of the 
customer-supplier relationship should impact the profitability of joint owner trade in 
supplier stock. Following the calendar-time long-short portfolio methodology from 
previous tests, I investigate how suppliers’ customer-base concentration impacts the 
profitability of trades by joint owners. Consistent with previous tests I create quintile 
portfolios based on aggregate changes in joint owner holdings, however I partition the 
sample of supplier firms into those with above median customer-base concentration and 
those with below median customer-base concentration. Joint owner trading portfolios of 
heavily purchased high customer-base concentration suppliers outperforms the portfolios 
of heavily sold high customer-base concentration suppliers by 1.49% (0.92%) per month 
using value-weighted (equal-weighted) averages. On the other hand, the profitability of 
joint owner trades in low customer-base concentration suppliers is much lower. In this 
case, the portfolio of heavily purchased low customer-base concentration suppliers only 
marginally outperform the portfolio of heavily sold low customer-base concentration 
suppliers by 0.86% (0.42%) per month using value-weighted (equal-weighted) averages. 
Elevated joint owner trading profits in suppliers with a concentrated customer base is 
consistent with joint owner institutions attaining greater benefit from analyzing supply 
chain information if the firm’s customer base is relatively dense. The value of 
8  
information mined from supply chain relationships is disparate across firms with varying 
customer-base concentrations. Tightly linked supply chains are more likely to contain 
valuable information for institutional traders than loosely knit supply chains.   
A potential alternative explanation for my results is that institutions derive and 
benefit from industry-level information rather than firm-specific information obtained 
from unique customer-supplier pairs (Huang and Kale, 2013). To explore this possibility, 
I assign each customer stock to a “pseudo-supplier” firm that closely matches its actual 
supplier. If industry-level information is the mechanism that drives informed trades, one 
should expect profitable institutional trading in pseudo-supplier firms. However, I find no 
evidence of informed trading by institutions trading in pseudo-supplier firms. It appears 
that joint owner trading profits are not driven by related industry-level information, but 
by information gathering about customer and supplier linked pairs and timely trading in 
supplier stock. 
Given my evidence of informed trading in supplier stock, another possible source 
of the information advantage that drives outperformance is that joint owners possess a 
superior ability to predict the upcoming earnings of supplier firms. I follow the 
methodology of Yan and Zhang (2009) to investigate this possibility. I find that joint 
owner trading predicts both earnings surprises and abnormal returns around earnings 
announcements. The quintile of suppler stock most heavily bought by institutions has 
0.89% higher earnings announcement returns (0.41% higher earnings surprise) around the 
subsequent quarter’s earnings announcement than the quintile of supplier stock most 
heavily sold by institutions. These findings support other studies that document 
9  
institutional trading skill is a function of institutions’ ability to forecast earnings (Baker, 
Litov, Wachter and Wurgler, 2010; Yan and Zhang, 2009; and Ali, Durtschi, Lev and 
Trombley, 2004). More importantly, my findings suggest one channel through which 
skilled traders are able to forecast earnings. Institutions extract information from complex 
economic relationships in the supply chain that is of material significance to future firm 
performance. These information gains are evidenced by the combination of profitable 
joint owner trading behavior and the predictive nature of joint owner trading on 
unexpected future earnings.   
In summary, this study identifies some explanations for why institutional 
investors are attracted to ownership of customer-supplier linked pairs. Institutional 
investors that own customer and supplier linked firms have the skill necessary to sort 
through information about complex customer-supplier relationships which allows them to 
affectively forecast future supplier earnings and leads to profitable trading in supplier 
stock. I document timely institutional trading by institutions that own a large stake in 
customer stock and in suppliers with strong economic ties to customer firms, which is 
consistent with institutional investors extracting material information from the complex 
supply chains to their benefit. 
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the data and 
sample selection for the study. Section III contains the empirical results of the study. 
Finally, Section IV contains a summary and conclusion of the research findings.  
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Chapter 2  
Data and Sample Selection 
The data for this study are obtained from several sources. Customer-supplier 
relationships are collected from the Compustat Customer Segments database. Public 
companies are required to annually disclose customers that account for more than 10% of 
their annual sales, and the Compustat Customer Segments database reports statistics from 
these disclosures.
3
 Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database is used to 
extract the quarterly institutional holdings.
4
 I exclude quasi-indexers from the sample of 
institutions in order to screen out institutional managers that passively form investment 
portfolios.
5
 Stock price and returns data are obtained from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) monthly dataset and financial statement data are collected from 
Compustat Annual. I include only common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) from 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, and following the convention of Patatoukas (2012), 
financial services firms are excluded from my analysis.
6
 
After restricting the sample to firms with corresponding institutional holdings 
data, stock returns and financial statement data, my sample includes 2,483 unique 
                                                 
 
3
 The process of retrieving the customer-supplier relationships from the database includes hand matching. 
Some companies report abbreviated customer names (e.g. IBM Corp instead of International Business 
Machines Corporation), which complicates comparisons to the full company name listed in Compustat. In 
an effort to match the customer names conservatively I am careful to check company websites and the 
Business Week company profiles. 
4
 Securities law requires that institutional investment managers with over $100 million in common stock 
positions must disclose their holdings in the SEC Form 13F. A manager is exempt from disclosing 
holdings fewer than 10,000 shares and less than $200,000 in market value. 
5
 The Bushee (2001) “quasi-indexer” classification identifies institutions with low turnover in their 
diversified portfolios. The long investment horizon and diversified holdings are characteristics consistent 
with a diversified buy-and-hold strategy. In an effort to isolate informed institutional trading from 
categorical portfolio formation, the sample excludes quasi-indexers. 
6
 I eliminate illiquid stock by dropping those with market capitalizations below $100 million. Further, to 
eliminate the effect of outliers I winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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customer-supplier pairs. Each paired relationship lasts an average of 2.54 years resulting 
in a sample of 5,184 supplier firm years and 4,520 customer firm years over the 1986 to 
2010 sample period.
7
 The average supplier has between one and two principle customers, 
each of which account for at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales; and the average 
customer has between two and three suppliers, which is consistent with the statistics 
reported in Cohen and Frazzini (2009).   
Summary statistics presented in Table 1 show that supplier firms are 
fundamentally different from customer firms. Consistent with prior literature (Pandit, 
Wasley and Zach, 2011), I find that customer firms are older and larger than supplier 
firms. Customer firms have an average market capitalization of $18.6 billion compared to 
$3.6 billion for supplier firms, and the average age of customer firms is approximately 13 
years larger than suppliers. Moreover, customer firms experience more than twice as 
much monthly trading volume, while the average supplier has greater volatility.  
Despite these differences between customer and supplier firms, the percent of 
total institutional ownership and book-to-market ratios in the two groups are similar. The 
average supplier firm is 61.15% owned by institutions and the average customer firm is 
63.38% owned by institutions. Book-to-market ratios for customer and supplier firms are 
also economically similar (0.469 versus 0.489). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
7
 Patatoukas (2012) and Cohen and Frazzini (2008) also limit their samples to unique supplier observations 
and use sales-weighted average customer characteristics across all principle customers of each supplier, if 
customer characteristics are needed in their analysis.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table shows summary statistics for the sample used in the study. Panel A presents a comparison of 
firm characteristic averages for three sets of firms: customer firms, supplier firms and all Compustat firms. 
Customer firms are recipients of at least 10% of a supplier’s sales. The sample consists of all firm-year 
observations between 1986 and 2010 with non-zero institutional ownership, excluding quasi-indexed 
institutions. Also, the sample excludes financial firms. The difference between the average customer firm 
and the average supplier firm is presented, where the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Size is the market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year. 
Volume is the average monthly trading volume during the fiscal year. B/M is the book to market ratio, in 
which the book value is calculated for the fiscal year ended before the most recent June 30 and the market 
value is calculated as of December 31 in that fiscal year. Total IO is the aggregate institutional ownership at 
the end of the fiscal year. Dividend yield is the cash dividend for the fiscal year ended before the most 
recent June 30 divided by the market capitalization as of December 31 in that fiscal year. Price is the stock 
price at the end of the fiscal year. Turnover is total trading volume divided by shares outstanding. Age is the 
number of months since the firm is listed in CRSP. Leverage is the total liabilities divided by the total 
liabilities plus the market capitalization. Volatility is the variance of monthly returns over the previous two 
years. Panel B presents customer-supplier relationship characteristics. It shows the average number of 
suppliers linked to each customer and the average number of customers linked to each supplier. The 
average institution’s percentage ownership in the customer and supplier are documented, as well as the 
average change in supplier ownership. Panel B also shows the average number of years the customer-
supplier link persists and the strength of the customer-supplier relationship. Customer-supplier relationship 
strength is measured in two ways: 1) Percentage of total supplier sales accounted for by customer and 2) 
Customer-base concentration measure (CC) introduced by Patatoukas (2012) to identify the supplier’s 
dependence on its customer base. 
 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
 
Customer Firms Supplier Firms 
Difference 
(Customer-Supplier) 
All Compustat 
     
Size ($millions) 18619 3586 15033*** 3951 
Volume (million) 43.74 17.570 26.17*** 14.8 
B/M 0.469 0.489 -0.02*** 0.507 
Total IO (%) 63.38 61.15 2.23*** 59.23 
Dividend yield (%) 1.59 0.84 0.75*** 1.31 
Price 39.82 24.63 15.19*** 28.52 
Turnover (%) 16.08 18.26 -2.18*** 15.07 
Age (months) 297.9 127.1 170.83*** 157.8 
Leverage (%) 38.74 30.87 7.87*** 34.97 
Volatility (%) 10.81 14.33 -3.52*** 12.84 
 
    Number of firm years 4520 5184   35142 
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Table 1. Continued. 
 
Panel B: Customer-Supplier Relationship Characteristics 
 
Mean Median Std Dev 
Number of suppliers linked to customer 2.765 1.000 4.654 
Number of customers linked to supplier 1.612 1.000 0.751 
Avg. ownership of customer (%) 0.288 0.026 1.204 
Avg. ownership of supplier (%) 0.512 0.055 1.645 
Avg. change in supplier ownership (abs %) 0.180 0.016 0.653 
Length of link (years) 2.535 2.000 2.399 
Percent of supplier total sales to customer 0.213 0.163 0.143 
Customer-base concentration (CC) 0.088 0.040 0.140 
 
 
It appears that the most of customer-supplier relationships do not exist in 
isolation, but are part of a greater network of economic relationships. The 
interconnectedness of customer-supplier relationships is illustrated in Figure 1, which 
shows a snapshot from the web of economically linked firms in the 2010 fiscal year. Each 
node in the web is a customer or supplier firm and each edge is a sales relationship 
connecting the two. The right side of the figure highlights the relationships of two 
customers: Macy’s Inc. and Nordstrom’s Inc. The nodes connected to Macy’s and 
Nordstrom are supplier firms (i.e. Ellis Perry International Inc., Deckers Outdoor Corp., 
Jones Group Inc., Estee Lauder Companies Inc., Joes Jeans Inc., etc.). The illustration 
underscores the interdependent nature of U.S. publically traded companies. In this study I 
explore potential information that is extracted from economic relationships by 
institutional investors.  
14  
 
Figure 1: Map of Customer-Supplier Linked Network 
15  
Chapter 3  
Empirical Results 
I investigate institutional ownership along the supply chain and institutional 
trading in supplier firms to determine whether institutions incorporate supply chain 
information into their ownership and trading decisions. I first investigate whether supply 
chain linkages are a significant determinant of institutional ownership. I then explore the 
impact supply chain linkages have on institutional trading profits. Finally, I examine the 
cross-sectional dispersion in institutional trading profits across different institutions and 
supplier firms.  
Supply Chain Linkages – Determinants of Institutional Ownership 
I investigate the likelihood of joint ownership (i.e. a single institution owning both 
a customer and supplier stock) in a univariate setting. Specifically, I calculate the 
conditional probability in each calendar year that an institution owns a supplier stock for 
two groups of institutions: i) those that own the paired customer, and ii) those that do not 
own the paired customer. Results presented in Table 2, Panel A show that 13.7% of 
institutions that own stock in the customer firm also own stock in the linked supplier 
firm. Alternatively, only 3.2% of institutions that do not own stock in the customer firm 
have an ownership stake in the linked supplier firm. Taken together, my results suggest 
that an institution is 428% more likely to own a supplier if it also owns the customer.  
In Panel B of Table 2, I reverse my research design and calculate the conditional 
probability that an institution owns a customer stock for two groups of institutions: i) 
those that own the paired supplier, and ii) those that do not own the paired supplier. Of  
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Table 2. Determinants of Customer and Supplier Firm Ownership 
This table presents probabilities of customer and supplier firm ownership conditional on ownership in one 
of the corresponding customer or supplier linked firms. The sample consists of all possible firm-institution 
pairings for each year. Panel A presents the probability of institutions owning supplier stock conditional on 
owning or not owning customer stock. Panel B presents the probability of institutions owning customer 
stock conditional on owning or not owning supplier stock.  
 
Panel A: Supplier Ownership Conditional on Customer Ownership (firm-manager-year observations) 
 Owns customer (yes) (N=1,530,842) Owns customer (no) (N=4,991,044) 
Owns supplier (yes) 13.7% 3.2% 
Owns supplier (no) 86.3% 96.8% 
   
Panel B: Customer Ownership Conditional on Supplier Ownership (firm-manager-year observations) 
 Owns supplier (yes) (N=370,228) Owns supplier (no) (N=6,151,658) 
Owns customer (yes) 56.6% 21.5% 
Owns customer (no) 43.4% 78.5% 
   
 
 
 
the institutions that own stock in the supplier firm, 56.6% of them also have an ownership 
stake in the linked customer. For institutions that do not own stock in the supplier firm, 
only 21.5% have an ownership stake in the linked customer firm. My results suggest that 
an institution is 263% more likely to own a customer stock if the institution owns the 
supplier. These conditional probabilities suggest that institutions demonstrate a 
preference for joint ownership in customer-supplier linked pairs.  
Univariate tests presented in Table 2 are informative but are also subject to 
concerns about selection and endogeneity bias. For example, large institutions are more 
likely to own a broad portfolio of stocks, and it is possible that this analysis simply 
uncovers the ownership characteristics of large versus small institutions. Alternatively, 
institutional investors might display ownership preferences for related industries but not 
17  
necessarily customer-supplier pairs. In order to alleviate concerns about these potential 
biases, I run two different multivariate tests. In the first (untabulated) multivariate tests, I 
explore the propensity for institutions to own customer-supplier linked pairs following 
the spirit of Yan and Zhang (2009).
8
 I augment the methodology used in Yan and Zhang 
(2009) by creating a unique observation for each potential institution-stock ownership 
pairing. I include independent variables for stock characteristics as in the model of Yan 
and Zhang (2009) and also include indicator variables that capture whether the institution 
has an ownership stake in the corresponding customer or supplier linked firm. I run 
Fama-MacBeth style cross-sectional regressions in each quarter and find that the 
coefficients on both the customer ownership and supplier ownership indicators are 
positive and statistically significant in all 100 quarterly regressions. While this analysis 
supports the view that supply chain linkages are an important determinant of institutional 
ownership, this multivariate analyses does not overcome potential endogeneity critiques.  
In order to overcome these endogeneity concerns and more clearly identify the 
tendency of institutions to own both customer and supplier linked stocks, I design a 
difference-in-difference test around the commencement of a new customer-supplier 
relationship. I identify the first year of each unique customer supplier relationship (year t) 
and sort institutions into two groups in the year before a customer-supplier relationship 
begins (year t-1): institutions that own the customer stock and institutions that do not own 
                                                 
 
8
 My approach, while consistent with Yan and Zhang (2009) differs in several important ways. Specifically, 
Yan and Zhang (2009) investigate determinants of aggregate institutional ownership, whereas I 
investigate determinants of ownership at the institution-stock level. For each potential institution-stock 
pairing, I include a separate observation. This innovation allows me to control for institution-specific 
features – including prior ownership of the customer firm. 
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the customer stock. For each group I calculate two variables of interest: 1) the number of 
unique institutions that own the corresponding supplier firm in the year prior to the 
customer-supplier relationship and in the year following, and 2) the total percentage 
ownership in the supplier firm across this same time horizon.  
I employ a pooled cross-sectional regression where the dependent variable is 
either: the percentage change in the number of unique institutions that own the supplier 
stock (% Change in Supplier Institutions) or the percentage change in the total ownership 
of the supplier stock (% Change in Supplier Inst Own). The research design produces two 
observations for each customer-supplier relationship commencement – one observation 
aggregated across institutional investors that own customer stock and one observation 
aggregated across institutional investors that do not own customer stock.  
The independent variable of interest, Customer Owner Dummy, is an indicator 
equal to one for institutions that own the customer stock and zero otherwise. All 
independent variables are expressed as of year t-1. Since large increases in institutional 
ownership are less likely for firms with high institutional ownership already (or large 
decreases for low beginning levels of institutional ownership), it is important to control 
for the composition of institutional ownership in year t-1. Institutional Ownership is the 
level of aggregate joint ownership or non-joint ownership in supplier stock as of the end 
of year t-1. The remainder of independent variables are consistent with those used in 
extant literature that investigates the determinants of institutional ownership (Gompers 
and Metrick, 2001; Yan and Zhang, 2009). The variables can broadly be categorized as 
proxies for investor prudence, liquidity or return predictability. The following four firm 
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characteristics proxy for investor prudence: Age – the number of months since the firm is 
listed in CRSP, S&P 500 – an indicator equal to one for S&P 500 firms,  Volatility – the 
two year variance of monthly returns, and Dividend yield – the cash dividend divided by 
the market capitalization. The following three firm characteristics proxy for liquidity and 
transaction costs: Price – the stock price, Size – the market capitalization, and Turnover – 
the total trading volume divided by shares outstanding. The following three firm 
characteristics are determinants of stock returns: B/M – the book to market ratio, Long 
Momentum – the cumulative return over the previous year, and Short Momentum – the 
cumulative return over the previous three months.  
The difference-in-difference regressions are presented in Table 3. I utilize the year 
after the new customer-supplier relationship (year t+1) as the post-period in the 
difference-in-difference tests reported in Table 3.
9
 In Column 1 I measure changes in the 
breadth of supplier ownership. The coefficient on the Customer Owner Dummy is 0.0254 
(P-value = 0.000) in Column 1 indicating that, on average, institutions with customer 
stock ownership are 2.54% more likely to initiate a position in the supplier stock in the 
first two years of the new customer-supplier relationship when compared to institutions 
with no customer stock ownership.  
Further, I explore whether institutions are likely to increase their level of supplier 
stock ownership after the commencement of a new customer-supplier relationship. In 
Column 2 I measure changes in the amount of supplier stock owned by institutions. The  
                                                 
 
9
 Since some institutions might acquire information about customer contracts from suppliers prior to their 
disclosure in supplier annual reports, I run the difference-in-difference regressions using year t as the 
post-period. The results are qualitatively similar using this alternative model specification.  
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Table 3. Changes in Joint Ownership around New Customer-Supplier Relationships 
This table presents OLS regression estimates from a difference-in-difference test around the commencement of a new 
customer-supplier relationship (year t). The dependent variable in column (1), % Change in Supplier Institutions, is the 
change in the number of joint owners or non-joint owners that own supplier stock from year t-1 to year t+1 around the 
initiation of the customer-supplier relationship, relative to the total number of institutions that own the customer stock 
before the initiation of the customer-supplier relationship. The dependent variable in column (2), % Change in Supplier 
Inst Own, is the change in aggregate joint ownership or non-joint ownership in the supplier from year t-1 to year t+1 
around the initiation of the customer-supplier relationship, relative to the total number of supplier shares outstanding. 
The dependent variables produce two observations for each customer-supplier relationship commencement event, one 
observation for aggregate joint owners and another for aggregate non-joint owners. The variable of interest, Customer 
Owner Dummy, is an indicator equal to one for joint owners and zero for non-joint owners. Control variables include 
supplier firm and stock characteristics expressed as of year t-1. Institutional Ownership is the level of aggregate joint 
owner or non-joint owner institutional ownership as of the end of year t-1. Age is the log of the number of months since 
the firm is listed in CRSP. B/M is the log of the book to market ratio, in which the book value is calculated for the fiscal 
year t-1 ended before the most recent June 30 and the market value is calculated as of December 31 in fiscal year t-1. 
Long Momentum is the 9-month cumulative return starting at the beginning of year t-1. Short Momentum is the 3-month 
cumulative return during the last quarter of year t-1. Price is the log of the stock price at the end of year t-1 Size is the 
log of the market capitalization at the end of year t-1. S&P 500 is an indicator equal to one if the firm is included in the 
S&P 500. Turnover is log of the total trading volume divided by shares outstanding. Volatility is the log of the variance 
of monthly returns over year t-1 and year t-2. Dividend yield is the log of the cash dividend for the fiscal year t-1 ended 
before the most recent June 30 divided by the market capitalization as of December 31 in fiscal year t-1. P-values, in 
parentheses, are based on White-corrected standard errors and significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated 
by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 
% Change in Supplier Institutions % Change in Supplier Inst Own 
      
Customer Owner Dummy 0.0254*** 0.0335*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Ownership -0.172*** -0.542*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
B/M 0.00684 0.0173 
 
(0.631) (0.278) 
Size 0.00396 -0.00366 
 
(0.355) (0.227) 
Short Momentum 0.0405*** -0.00734 
 
(0.000) (0.482) 
Long Momentum 0.00228 0.00469 
 
(0.542) (0.336) 
Price 0.00840 0.0165*** 
 
(0.154) (0.002) 
Dividend Yield 0.153 0.349 
 
(0.632) (0.237) 
Volatility -0.146*** 0.00879 
 
(0.003) (0.880) 
Turnover 0.0151 0.0489** 
 
(0.530) (0.039) 
Age -0.00981** -0.00478 
 
(0.016) (0.250) 
S&P 500 -0.0111 -0.00625 
 
(0.345) (0.542) 
Constant 0.0420 0.0340 
 
(0.114) (0.193) 
  
Observations 1,610 1,610 
R-squared 0.064 0.306 
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coefficient on the Customer Owner Dummy is 0.0335 (P-value = 0.000) in Column 2 
indicating that, on average, institutions that own customer stock increase their supplier 
stock ownership 3.35% more than institutions with no customer stock ownership in the 
first two years of a new customer-supplier relationship. These results suggest that 
institutions are not coincidentally holding customer and supplier stock in their portfolios, 
but are intentionally seeking out stock ownership in customer-supplier linked pairs. 
Profitability of Supply Firm Institutional Trading 
Value relevant information revealed by customer firms is impounded into supplier 
stock prices with a lag. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) conjecture that this return 
predictability across customer and supplier linked pairs is driven by investor inattention. 
If return predictability across the supply chain is a function of investor inattention, then 
any investor observing a shock to a customer firm should be able to profitably trade in the 
corresponding supplier. I examine whether institutional investors, who are typically 
characterized as informed traders, are able to capitalize on the inefficiency in prices along 
the supply chain.  
My tests employ calendar time portfolios to investigate the profitability of 
institutional trading in supplier stocks. For each supplier firm-quarter I aggregate changes 
in quarterly holdings by institutions. I then divide supplier firms into quintiles based on 
aggregate changes in quarterly institutional ownership. I follow the value- and equal-
weighted returns of quintile portfolios for the subsequent three months using excess 
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returns, Fama French three-factor returns and DGTW benchmark adjusted returns.
10
 
Excess returns are calculated as the raw return less the risk-free rate. The three-factor 
returns are the alphas from regressions of excess returns on Fama and French (1993) 
market, size and book-to-market risk factors. DGTW benchmark adjusted returns are 
calculated by subtracting DGTW benchmarks from the returns for the stocks within each 
of the benchmark portfolios. The DGTW benchmarks are characteristic-based 
benchmarks established by dividing all firms into 125 portfolios based on size, book-to-
market and momentum quintiles (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers, 1997; 
Wermers, 2004).
11
 Long-short abnormal return portfolios are created to simulate the 
abnormal return from a zero-cost portfolio in which I buy the stocks in the quintile most 
heavily bought by institutions over the previous quarter and sell short the stocks in the 
quintile most heavily sold by institutions over the previous quarter. 
 I present institutional trading results in Panel A of Table 4, which provides weak 
evidence of abnormal trading profits. The long-short portfolio DGTW benchmark 
adjusted return is 0.610% per month (P-value = 0.044). Institutional investor abnormal 
trading profits in supplier stock suggests that, in aggregate, institutional investors obtain a 
slight information advantage in trading across the supply chain. However, the 
information advantage might not be shared equally across all institutional investors.  
 
                                                 
 
10
 We explore institutional trading in supplier stock as opposed to customer stock, because shocks to the 
customer firm are incorporated into supplier stock in a lagged fashion (Cohen and Frazzini, 2009). The 
supplier firms’ dependency on linked customer firms as a prominent source of revenue is why shocks to 
customer earnings, cash flows and stock returns have a ripple effect up the supply chain to supplier firms 
(Pandit, Wasley and Zach, 2011). 
11
 The DGTW benchmarks are available via 
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm 
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Table 4. Supplier Abnormal Returns Following Change in Institutional Holdings 
This table contains calendar time portfolio monthly supplier abnormal percentage returns following 
changes in institutional holdings. At the beginning of each quarter, supplier stocks are sorted into quintile 
portfolios based on aggregate institutional trading over the prior quarter. Then the portfolio monthly 
supplier abnormal percentage returns are observed over the subsequent quarter. The analysis in Panel A 
includes all institutional trading at the supplier stock for each quarter. In Panel B the analysis is restricted to 
institutional trading by institutions that have ownership in the customer stock (i.e. joint owners), and in 
Panel C the analysis is restricted to institutional trading by institutions that do not have ownership in the 
customer stock (i.e. non-joint owners). The returns are measured using excess returns, Fama French three-
factor returns and DGTW benchmark adjusted returns. Excess returns are calculated as the raw return less 
the risk-free rate. The three-factor returns are the alphas from regressing excess returns on Fama and 
French (1993) market, size and book-to-market risk factors. DGTW benchmark adjusted returns are 
calculated by subtracting DGTW benchmarks from the returns for the stocks within each of the benchmark 
portfolios. The DGTW benchmarks are characteristic-based benchmarks established by dividing all firms 
into 125 portfolios based on size, book-to-market and momentum quintiles (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and 
Wermers, 1997; Wermers, 2004). L/S is the abnormal return from a zero-cost portfolio that buys the stocks 
in the top quintile (Q5) and sells short the stocks in the bottom quintile (Q1). P-values for the L/S portfolio 
are in parentheses, and significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: All Institutions 
 
Value Weighted Returns   Equal Weighted Returns 
 
 Excess 
Returns 
3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
  Excess 
Returns 
 3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
Q1 0.28787 -0.30129 -0.37187 
 
0.33099 -0.41311 -0.26740 
Q2 0.32461 -0.14340 -0.08214 
 
0.59785 -0.11343 -0.10130 
Q3 0.51073 0.05585 0.12202 
 
0.71626 -0.00267 0.16207 
Q4 0.58434 0.11440 -0.05309 
 
0.74886 0.05857 0.08436 
Q5 0.84790 0.33201 0.23792 
 
1.02885 0.32991 0.32638 
 
L/S 0.56003* 0.63330* 0.60979** 
 
0.69786*** 0.74302*** 0.59377** 
P-value (0.09229) (0.05348) (0.04398)   (0.00502) (0.00268) (0.01259) 
        Panel B: Joint Owners 
 
Value Weighted Returns   Equal Weighted Returns 
 
 Excess 
Returns 
3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
  Excess 
Returns 
 3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
Q1 0.02860 -0.55278 -0.55112 
 
0.32204 -0.36314 -0.31808 
Q2 0.29413 -0.20307 -0.00014 
 
0.59572 -0.15203 -0.04145 
Q3 0.62505 0.27398 -0.08792 
 
0.73922 0.06196 0.09084 
Q4 0.39890 -0.12652 -0.19024 
 
0.60758 -0.15283 -0.02396 
Q5 1.10374 0.57382 0.52482 
 
1.14090 0.45732 0.41115 
 
L/S 1.07513*** 1.12659*** 1.07593*** 
 
0.81886*** 0.82047*** 0.72923** 
P-value (0.00883) (0.00617) (0.00591)   (0.00544) (0.00483) (0.01094) 
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Table 4. Continued. 
Panel C: Non-joint Owners 
 
Value Weighted Returns   Equal Weighted Returns 
 
 Excess 
Returns 
3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
  Excess 
Returns 
 3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
Q1 0.38053 -0.22465 -0.18873 
 
0.54163 -0.19301 -0.10624 
Q2 0.42895 -0.01822 -0.17735 
 
0.58923 -0.10213 -0.06981 
Q3 0.70752 0.23663 0.30538 
 
0.56394 -0.15017 -0.02171 
Q4 0.82222 0.31536 0.27634 
 
0.93747 0.24316 0.28688 
Q5 0.66784 0.14074 0.10899 
 
0.78774 0.05069 0.11480 
 
L/S 0.28730 0.36538 0.29772 
 
0.24611 0.24371 0.22104 
P-value (0.39787) (0.27586) (0.33150)   (0.24933) (0.26193) (0.28468) 
 
 
 
Complex supply chain information might be better understood by investors that are 
relatively more familiar with customer-supplier relationships.  
Given that customer and supplier firms are exposed to common economic shocks 
(Menzly and Ozbas, 2010; Cohen and Fazzini, 2008; Pandit, Wasley and Zach, 2011), 
one potential reason why institutions intentionally maintain ownership in pairs of 
customer-supplier linked firms is because of the economies of scale associated with 
information gathering. Further, stock ownership in economically linked firms might lead 
to superior understanding about how customer firm behavior translates into the future 
health of supplier firms. In subsequent tests, I use joint ownership to identify institutions 
with superior information about economic relationships. 
I explore the profitability of joint ownership trades using the calendar time 
methodology from Table 4, Panel A. First, I partition institutional ownership in each 
supplier firm-quarter into two groups: 1) institutions that have ownership in the customer 
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(i.e. joint owners) and 2) institutions that do not have ownership in the customer (i.e. non-
joint owners). For each supplier firm-quarter I aggregate changes in quarterly holdings by 
joint owners and non-joint owners. I divide supplier firms into quintiles based on 
aggregate changes in quarterly ownership. I then follow the returns of the portfolios over 
the adjacent three months.   
When looking at the institutional trading in the supplier stocks conditional on 
institutions owning the customer stock, institutional trading profits are much higher than 
the unconditional aggregate institutional trading profits reported in Panel A. According to 
the long-short portfolio returns in Table 4, Panel B, joint owner trades in the supplier 
generate abnormal returns of  1.076% per month (P-value = 0.006).
12
 These results 
demonstrate that supply chain trading gains are attained, to a much larger extent, by 
institutions that own pairs of customer-supplier linked firms. It appears that with 
institutions that own corresponding pairs of customer and supplier firms benefiting from 
superior information about the customer-supplier relationships.  
On the other hand, institutional trading in the supplier stock conditional on the 
institutions not owning the linked customer stock does not represent informed trading. On 
average, the long-short portfolio abnormal returns for non-joint owner trades is 0.298% 
                                                 
 
12
 I find that joint owner trading in the supplier yields abnormal returns close to zero over the twelve month 
horizon. It appears that the sizeable joint owner trading profits begin to fade away in the long-run. I do 
not lean heavily on this result because of the issues associated with long-run abnormal return 
measurement.  
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per month (P-value= 0.332). Results from this analysis suggest that trading gains in 
supplier stock may be difficult to capture using widely observed public information.
13
  
These results suggest that institutional trading in supplier stock is more profitable 
if the institution owns stock in both sides of the customer-supplier relationship.
14
 This is 
consistent with the analyst literature that documents analysts covering both the customer 
and supplier stocks are more accurate in forecasting supplier earnings than analysts that 
do not cover the linked customer (Guan, Wong, and Zhang, 2014). Like securities 
analysts, institutional managers seem to have an informational advantage when they are 
familiar with linked pairs of customers and suppliers. In the case of institutional 
managers, joint ownership provides the familiarity necessary to produce profitable 
trading in supplier stock.
15
 
While ownership in the customer firm seems to be important for institutional 
trading in the supplier to be profitable, is a large ownership stake in the customer more 
beneficial to the institutional trading profits than a small ownership stake in the 
customer? According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985) greater ownership increases the 
benefits and costs incurred by the owner, which entices owners to be astute to changes at 
                                                 
 
13
 The lack of trading profits by non-joint owner trades provides evidence that the institutional trading profits 
by joint owners are not driven by firm characteristics. In a slightly restricted sample, I investigate joint 
owner and non-joint owner trading profits at suppliers that have at least one joint owner and non-joint 
owner and I find a similar contrast between joint owner trading profits and non-joint owner trading 
profits. If the joint owner trading profits are a product of firm specific characteristics, then I would also 
find trading profits by the non-joint owners of these stocks. Moreover, DGTW benchmark adjusted 
returns and factor model alphas control for the most important idiosyncratic risk factors. 
14
 In untabulated results I make similar inferences from regression output using one-factor alphas, four-factor 
alphas and five-factor alphas.  
15
 The 13f data does not allow me to know precisely when these institutional trades occur during the calendar 
quarter. The coarseness of 13f data biases me against finding evidence of profitable trading in supplier 
stock. 
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the firm. Following this logic, a larger stake in the customer will benefit institutional 
trading profits at the supplier firm. However, concentrated ownership could also 
represent overconfidence that could hinder institutional trading profits. Institutions that 
have experienced historical success in picking stocks might become overconfident in 
their skill level. They might believe that their knowledge about a security’s value is 
greater than it actually is and unwisely under-diversify their portfolio in search of higher 
alpha.    
The profitability of institutional trading by institutions with large and small 
customer stock ownership is calculated using the calendar time methodology used in 
Table 4. I partition institutional ownership in each supplier firm-quarter into two groups: 
1) joint owners with above median customer stock ownership and 2) joint owners with 
below median customer stock ownership. For each group, I create trading portfolios and 
present results in an identical manner to those presented in Table 4. 
Panel A of Table 5 presents institutional trading profits in supplier stock for joint 
owners with above median customer stock ownership. The long-short portfolio DGTW 
benchmark adjusted return is 1.140% per month (P-value = 0.003). In contrast to these 
large abnormal returns, the abnormal trading profits following institutional trading in 
supplier stock conditional on the institutions having below median customer stock 
ownership are muted (see Panel B of Table 5). The long-short portfolio alpha for this 
subset of institutions is 0.367% per month (P-value = 0.317). These results suggest that 
large ownership in the customer firm increases the profitability of the institutional trading 
in the supplier stock, which is inconsistent with overconfident institutions concentrating  
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Table 5. Supplier Abnormal Returns Following Changes in Joint Owner Holdings: Conditional on 
Customer Ownership Level 
This table contains calendar time portfolio monthly supplier abnormal percentage returns following 
changes in joint owner holdings, conditional on the level of ownership in the customer firm. At the 
beginning of each quarter, supplier stocks are sorted into quintile portfolios based on aggregate joint owner 
trading over the prior quarter. Then the portfolio monthly supplier abnormal percentage returns are 
observed over the subsequent quarter. In Panel A the analysis is restricted to institutional trading by joint 
owners that have above median customer stock ownership (i.e. heavy customer ownership), and in Panel B 
the analysis is restricted to institutional trading by joint owners that have below median customer stock 
ownership (i.e. light customer ownership). The returns are measured using excess returns, Fama French 
three-factor returns and DGTW benchmark adjusted returns. Excess returns are calculated as the raw return 
less the risk-free rate. The three-factor returns are the alphas from regressing excess returns on Fama and 
French (1993) market, size and book-to-market risk factors. DGTW benchmark adjusted returns are 
calculated by subtracting DGTW benchmarks from the returns for the stocks within each of the benchmark 
portfolios. The DGTW benchmarks are characteristic-based benchmarks established by dividing all firms 
into 125 portfolios based on size, book-to-market and momentum quintiles (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and 
Wermers, 1997; Wermers, 2004). L/S is the abnormal return from a zero-cost portfolio that buys the stocks 
in the top quintile (Q5) and sells short the stocks in the bottom quintile (Q1). P-values for the L/S portfolio 
are in parentheses, and significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Heavy Customer Ownership 
 
Value Weighted Returns  Equal Weighted Returns 
 
 Excess 
Returns 
3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
  Excess 
Returns 
 3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
Q1 0.06993 -0.51168 -0.53454  0.23523 -0.49287 -0.40984 
Q2 0.52539 0.13373 0.10016  0.60543 -0.10175 -0.06247 
Q3 0.99894 0.54745 0.28258  0.71896 0.01395 0.07998 
Q4 0.77205 0.28581 0.25543  0.66586 -0.05674 0.01095 
Q5 1.16961 0.63908 0.60551  1.30058 0.58851 0.57940 
 
L/S 1.09968*** 1.15076*** 1.14005***  1.06535*** 1.08138*** 0.98924*** 
P-value (0.00711) (0.00494) (0.00345)   (0.00036) (0.0003) (0.00065) 
    
 
   Panel B: Light Customer Ownership 
 
Value Weighted Returns  Equal Weighted Returns 
 
 Excess 
Returns 
3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
  Excess 
Returns 
 3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
Q1 0.51766 -0.02731 -0.18014  0.5811 -0.10499 -0.06818 
Q2 0.15391 -0.34957 -0.38979  0.52939 -0.17974 -0.1202 
Q3 0.77365 0.29686 0.45005  0.82415** 0.11515 0.20713 
Q4 0.74656 0.26210 0.12214  0.71564 -0.00110 0.09158 
Q5 0.83185 0.30862 0.18660  0.83817* 0.11151 0.09659 
 
L/S 0.31419 0.33593 0.36674  0.25707 0.2165 0.31419 
P-value (0.43414) (0.40786) (0.31711)   (0.35324) (0.43161) (0.43414) 
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their ownership into customer firms. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the null hypothesis, 
that information gathering along the supply chain does not generate abnormal 
institutional trading profits. The results provide evidence that large institutional 
ownership in the customer firm could encourage closer analysis of the customer-supplier 
relationship, and subsequently, institutions might be able to extract information from the 
nature of the customer-supplier relationship that enhances the profitability of their trades 
in the supplier stock.
16
 
If some institutions benefit from information extracted from customer-supplier 
relationships, then does the strength of the customer-supplier relationship also impact the 
institutional trading profits in supplier stock? The value of customer information on a 
corresponding supplier is amplified or dampened based on the extent to which the 
supplier is dependent on its major customers for revenues. I would expect that 
institutional trading profits would be more common in supplier firms with concentrated 
sales relationships.  
The next series of tests incorporate the Patatoukas (2012) customer-base 
concentration measure into the trading portfolio analysis in order to identify how 
variations in the density of the customer base across supplier firms impacts joint owner 
trading profits. The Patatoukas (2012) customer-base concentration measure (CC) is a 
variation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index that produces a normalized measure of the 
                                                 
 
16
 One possible explanation of these results is that larger institutions are more skilled and also more likely to 
own customer stock. Actually, the correlation between joint ownership and institution size is 0.143, 
indicating that largest institutions do not drive joint ownership. In multivariate regressions, I control for 
the joint owner institution size and I find that joint owner trading profits are not significantly impacted by 
institutions size.    
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diversity of supplier’s customer base. The customer-base concentration measure is 
calculated for each supplier firm across the firm’s J principle customers, as presented 
below: 
                (1) 
where Salesijt is supplier firm i’s sales to customer j in year t and Salesit is the supplier 
firm i’s total sales in year t.  
Institutional trading profits by joint owners at suppliers with high and low 
customer-base concentration are calculated using the same calendar time methodology as 
that used in Panel B of Table 4, while partitioning the sample of suppliers to those with 
above median customer-base concentration and those with below median customer-base 
concentration. Long-short portfolio returns of joint owner trading in the partitioned 
sample are presented in Table 4. When analyzing the institutional trading by joint owners 
at suppliers with high customer-base concentration, the long-short portfolio from the 
value-weighted three factor model has an alpha of 1.493% (P-value = 0.001). On the 
other hand, the long-short portfolio abnormal returns for the joint owners at suppliers 
with a low customer-base concentration are 0.855% (P-value = 0.075). I find that the 
information advantage attained by institutions that own customer-supplier linked pairs is 
amplified when the supplier is dependent on a small customer base for sales revenue. 
These results agree with my hypothesis that supply chain information is more value 
relevant to future supplier performance if the supplier is more tightly linked to customer 
firms down the supply chain. Suppliers with concentrated customer bases appear to be a 
fertile environment for joint owners to obtain profitable information.  
31  
Table 6. Supplier Abnormal Returns Following Changes in Joint Owner Holdings: Conditional on 
Customer-base Concentration 
This table contains calendar time portfolio monthly supplier abnormal percentage returns following 
changes in joint owner holdings, conditional on customer-base concentration. At the beginning of each 
quarter, supplier stocks are sorted into quintile portfolios based on aggregate institutional trading over the 
prior quarter. Then the portfolio monthly supplier abnormal percentage returns are observed over the 
subsequent quarter. The results in Panel A (Panel B) are reported for stocks that have above median (below 
median) customer-base concentration, using the Patatoukas (2012) customer-base concentration measure 
(CC). The returns are measured using excess returns, Fama French three-factor returns and DGTW 
benchmark adjusted returns. Excess returns are calculated as the raw return less the risk-free rate. The 
three-factor returns are the alphas from regressing excess returns on Fama and French (1993) market, size 
and book-to-market risk factors. DGTW benchmark adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting DGTW 
benchmarks from the returns for the stocks within each of the benchmark portfolios. The DGTW 
benchmarks are characteristic-based benchmarks established by dividing all firms into 125 portfolios based 
on size, book-to-market and momentum quintiles (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers, 1997; Wermers, 
2004). L/S is the abnormal return from a zero-cost portfolio that buys the stocks in the top quintile (Q5) and 
sells short the stocks in the bottom quintile (Q1). P-values for the L/S portfolio are in parentheses, and 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: High Customer-Base Concentration 
 
Value Weighted Returns  Equal Weighted Returns 
 
 Excess 
Returns 
3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
  Excess 
Returns 
 3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
Q1 -0.20534 -0.77054 -0.83719  0.08087 -0.54930 -0.61185 
Q2 -0.14794 -0.66318 -0.26000  0.53525 -0.21547 -0.03172 
Q3 0.88718 0.39534 -0.00098  0.81235 0.06881 0.11919 
Q4 0.56598 0.12468 0.06535  0.55403 -0.12311 -0.11727 
Q5 1.34545 0.82422 0.65568  1.05106 0.38186 0.31026 
 
L/S 1.55078*** 1.59476*** 1.49287***  0.9702*** 0.93116** 0.92211** 
P-value (0.00072) (0.00057) (0.00118)   (0.00792) (0.01023) (0.01146) 
    
 
   Panel B: Low Customer-Base Concentration 
 
Value Weighted Returns  Equal Weighted Returns 
 
 Excess 
Returns 
3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
  Excess 
Returns 
 3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
Q1 0.01939 -0.53391 -0.41594  0.50558 -0.26225 -0.03457 
Q2 0.50626 -0.03443 0.02462  0.78414 0.03778 0.04766 
Q3 0.61503 0.15824 -0.07452  0.42553 -0.22586 -0.19853 
Q4 0.66732 0.14278 0.17741  1.09879 0.36673 0.49764 
Q5 1.02541 0.42237 0.43907  1.08044 0.31919 0.38581 
 
L/S 1.00602** 0.95628* 0.85501*  0.57486 0.58144 0.42038 
P-value (0.04297) (0.05791) (0.07465)   (0.12893) (0.13151) (0.25559) 
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Possible Mechanisms Driving Joint Owner Trading Profits 
In this section of the paper I explore some of the possible mechanisms used by 
institutions to attain abnormal trading profits. One potential source of joint owner trading 
profits is industry-level information (Huang and Kale, 2013 and Kacperczyk, Sialm, and 
Zheng, 2005). Joint owners might trade in customer and supplier linked firms in order to 
profit from return predictability across customer and supplier industries (Menzly and 
Ozbas, 2010).  
To test whether related industry level information is driving joint owner trading 
profits I investigate institutional trading in industry peers of supplier firms (i.e. pseudo-
suppliers). A pseudo-supplier is a firm that is within the same industry (4 digit SIC) as 
the supplier and is most similar in size (within 50% of supplier market capitalization). I 
identify institutions that own customer stock and pseudo-supplier stock and analyze 
trades by these institutions in the pseudo-supplier. For each quarter, I aggregate changes 
in quarterly holdings in the pseudo-supplier to create trading portfolios. Institutional 
trading profits in pseudo-supplier stock are calculated using the calendar time 
methodology implemented in previous tables.  
In Table 7 I present the long-short portfolio alphas following institutional trading 
at pseudo-suppliers. Superior trading profits at pseudo-supplier firms  would be evidence  
that industry-level information is the source of joint owner trading profits, on the other 
hand, poor trading profits at pseudo-supplier firms would suggest that joint owner trading 
profits are independent of the Menzly and Ozbas (2010) customer-supplier industry 
cross-predictability. I find that the average abnormal returns from the long-short  
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Table 7. Pseudo-supplier Abnormal Returns Following Change in Institutional Holdings 
This table contains calendar time portfolio monthly pseudo-supplier abnormal percentage returns, 
following changes in institutional trading. A pseudo-supplier is a firm that is within the same industry (4 
digit SIC code) as the supplier and most similar in size (within 50% of market capitalization). At the 
beginning of each quarter, pseudo-supplier stocks are sorted into quintile portfolios based on aggregate 
institutional trading over the prior quarter. Then the portfolio monthly pseudo-supplier abnormal 
percentage returns are observed over the subsequent quarter. For this analysis I only observe trades by 
institutions that own the customer stock and own the pseudo-supplier stock. The returns are measured using 
excess returns, Fama French three-factor returns and DGTW benchmark adjusted returns. Excess returns 
are calculated as the raw return less the risk-free rate. The three-factor returns are the alphas from 
regressing excess returns on Fama and French (1993) market, size and book-to-market risk factors. DGTW 
benchmark adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting DGTW benchmarks from the returns for the 
stocks within each of the benchmark portfolios. The DGTW benchmarks are characteristic-based 
benchmarks established by dividing all firms into 125 portfolios based on size, book-to-market and 
momentum quintiles (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers, 1997; Wermers, 2004). L/S is the abnormal 
return from a zero-cost portfolio that buys the stocks in the top quintile (Q5) and sells short the stocks in 
the bottom quintile (Q1). P-values for the L/S portfolio are in parentheses, and significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
Value Weighted Returns   Equal Weighted Returns 
 
 Excess 
Returns 
3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
  Excess 
Returns 
 3 Factor 
Returns 
DGTW 
Returns 
Q1 0.44018 -0.15404 -0.18578 
 
0.61107 -0.06581 0.06775 
Q2 0.59740 0.13125 0.05845 
 
0.77971 0.14119 0.10724 
Q3 0.55895 0.01975 -0.01630 
 
0.69046 -0.01842 -0.03232 
Q4 0.64137 0.17875 -0.08649 
 
1.02427 0.31720 0.21444 
Q5 0.81195 0.28637 0.08990 
 
0.99140 0.27793 0.25984 
        
L/S 0.37178 0.44041 0.27567 
 
0.38033 0.34373 0.19209 
P-value (0.40226) (0.32571) (0.51657)   (0.25365) (0.30889) (0.54165) 
 
 
 
portfolio analysis are an insignificant 0.276% per month (P-value= 0.517). These results 
suggest that related industry concentration and customer-supplier industry cross-
predictability are not the mechanism that drives joint owner trading profits. Therefore, 
joint owners appear to gain from the information gathered from customer and supplier 
linked pairs, not broad information from customer and supplier industries.  
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An alternative explanation for institutional trading profits in the supplier firm is 
that institutional investors have the ability to identify the direction of future supplier 
earnings. Baker, Litov, Wachter and Wurgler (2010) suggest that mutual fund manager 
skill is in part a function of their ability to forecast earnings fundamentals. They find that 
stocks bought by mutual funds tend to have higher subsequent earnings announcement 
returns than the stocks sold by mutual funds, which indicates that the average mutual 
fund demonstrates stock-picking skill. In my study, I explore whether institutional 
investor trades predict future supplier earnings news to determine whether institutional 
trading profits in the supply chain are generated by their ability to forecast earnings 
fundamentals.  
The supply chain is a unique setting from which to investigate whether 
institutions are able to predict future earnings, because economic relationships are a 
potentially valuable source of information that might be used to forecast supplier earnings 
news. According to Pandit, Wasley and Zach (2011) customer earnings news has an 
information externality on supplier earnings. Further, information from customer 
earnings reduces the uncertainty of future supplier earnings. If joint owners closely 
monitor customer behavior and revealed information about the customer-supplier 
relationship and adjust their positions in supplier stock based on expectations about future 
supplier earnings, then I would expect changes in institutional holdings prior to supplier 
earnings announcements to be informed. Otherwise, joint owner institutional trading 
profits are not a function of attentiveness to the impact of revealed information about 
economically linked firms on future supplier earnings. 
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I construct a test to explore whether the institutional trading profits are derived by 
a superior ability of joint owners to predict the upcoming earnings surprises of supplier 
firms. Following the methodology of Yan and Zhang (2009), I use institutional trading 
portfolios to calculate earnings announcement abnormal returns and earnings surprises. 
Each quarter, I divide stocks into quintiles based on changes in joint owner or non-joint 
owner institutional holdings, where Q5 (Q1) contains stocks with the largest increase 
(decrease) in joint ownership or non-joint ownership. Three-day market adjusted returns 
are calculated as the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from day t-1 to t+1 around each 
supplier earnings announcement day t. The earnings surprise is the raw difference 
between actual earnings and consensus analyst forecast divided by the stock price. The 
mean earnings announcement CAR and earnings surprise are calculated for each quintile 
portfolio over the subsequent four quarterly earnings announcements.  
In Panel A of Table 8 I report the earnings announcement CARs following 
changes in joint ownership and non-joint ownership in supplier stock. The average three-
day CAR (-1, 1) around supplier earnings announcements in the quarter following large 
decreases in joint owner holdings (Portfolio Q1) is -0.377% (P-value = 0.041). On the 
other hand, the average CAR around supplier earnings announcements in the quarter 
following large increases in joint owner holdings (Portfolio Q5) is 0.509% (P-value = 
0.012). The difference in earnings announcement CARs in Q5 and Q1 is a significant 
0.886% (P-value= 0.001). It appears that changes in joint owner holdings have a direct 
impact on subsequent supplier earnings announcement CARs. These results are in 
agreement with my hypothesis that institutions study how economically linked firm  
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Table 8. Institutional Trading Prior to Earnings Announcements 
This table contains the earnings announcement abnormal returns and earnings surprises in the four quarters 
following quarterly institutional trading portfolios. Following the methodology of Yan and Zhang (2009), I 
use institutional trading portfolios to calculate earnings announcement abnormal returns and earnings 
surprises. Each quarter, I divide stocks into quintiles based on changes in joint owner or non-joint owner 
institutional holdings, where Q5 (Q1) contains stocks with the largest increase (decrease) in joint ownership 
or non-joint ownership. Three-day market adjusted returns are calculated as the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) from day t-1 to t+1 around each supplier earnings announcement day t. The earnings surprise is the 
raw difference between actual earning and consensus analyst forecasts divided by the stock price. The 
mean earnings announcement CAR and earnings surprise are calculated for each quintile portfolio over the 
subsequent four quarterly earnings announcements. The difference between the top and bottom quintile 
(Q5-Q1) is reported. P-values for the differences are in parentheses, and significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Earnings Announcement Abnormal Returns (%) 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
Joint Owners 
    Q1 -0.377 0.048 0.076 0.18 
Q2 -0.044 -0.024 0.157 -0.169 
Q3 -0.203 -0.149 -0.016 -0.32 
Q4 0.115 -0.022 -0.252 -0.054 
Q5 0.509 -0.025 0.003 0.375 
Q5-Q1 0.886*** -0.072 -0.073 0.195 
P-value (0.001) (0.807) (0.842) (0.542) 
     Non-Joint Owners 
   Q1 -0.149 -0.358 0.056 -0.129 
Q2 -0.257 0.051 -0.005 -0.211 
Q3 -0.067 -0.160 -0.209 0.110 
Q4 -0.178 0.196 -0.233 -0.124 
Q5 0.090 -0.153 -0.090 -0.238 
Q5-Q1 0.239 0.205 -0.146 -0.109 
P-value (0.327) (0.347) (0.516) (0.645) 
     Panel B: Earnings Surprises (%) 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 
Joint Owners 
    Q1 -0.306 0.188 -0.097 0.033 
Q2 0.037 0.022 0.036 -0.026 
Q3 -0.009 0.034 -0.015 0.011 
Q4 0.041 -0.047 -0.013 -0.013 
Q5 0.104 0.077 0.088 -0.029 
Q5-Q1 0.410** -0.111 0.185* -0.062 
P-value (0.018) (0.521) (0.075) (0.560) 
     Non-Joint Owners 
   Q1 -0.017 -0.118 0.016 0.038 
Q2 0.023 0.034 0.000 -0.018 
Q3 0.036 -0.025 0.012 -0.003 
Q4 0.026 -0.001 -0.004 0.006 
Q5 0.053 0.068 0.033 0.044 
Q5-Q1 0.070* 0.186 0.016 0.006 
P-value (0.089) (0.190) (0.649) (0.796) 
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behavior and customer-supplier contracts impact future supplier earnings to profitably 
trade in supplier stock.    
The link between changes in joint owner holdings in the supplier stock and future 
earnings announcement CARs dissipates beyond the adjoining quarter. The difference 
between earnings announcement CARs in Q5 and Q1 are insignificant in quarters t+2, 
t+3 and t+4. This indicates that while joint owner trading in supplier stock is predictive of 
future supplier earnings news, the information advantage gained by joint owners is short 
lived.  
Non-joint owners trading in supplier stock do not appear to predict future supplier 
earnings news. The difference in supplier earnings announcement CARs following large 
increases in non-joint owner holdings (Q5) and large decreases in non-joint owner 
holdings (Q1) is an insignificant 0.239% (P-value = 0.327). The difference in earnings 
announcement CARs in Q5 and Q1 are also insignificant in quarters t+2, t+3 and t+4. 
This result is consistent with non-joint owners’ inability to incorporate information about 
the customer-supplier relationship into trades in supplier stock. In particular, it shows a 
mechanism through which joint owners, not non-joint owners, attain trading profits in 
supplier stock. Joint owners successfully extract valuable information about future 
earnings news from customer-supplier relationships to profitably trading in supplier 
stock.   
Next, I explore whether changes in institutional holdings predict earnings 
surprises. To the extent that earnings surprises are correlated with abnormal returns 
around earnings announcements I expect the same result. In Panel B of Table 8 I 
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document the price adjusted earnings surprises by joint owners and non-joint owners. The 
average earnings surprise in the quarter following large decreases (increases) in joint 
owner holdings of supplier stock is -0.306% (0.104%), resulting in a difference between 
Q5 and Q1 of 0.410% (P-value = 0.018). However, joint owner trading has a weaker 
impact on more distant future supplier earnings surprises. Consistent with the previous 
results that demonstrate the relationship between changes in joint owner holdings and 
future earnings announcement CARs I find that changes in joint owner holdings predict 
subsequent supplier earnings surprises. 
Changes in non-joint owner holdings in supplier stock only very weakly predict 
future supplier earnings surprises. The difference in supplier earnings surprises following 
large increases in non-joint owner holdings (Q5) and large decreases in non-joint owner 
holdings (Q1) is 0.070% (P-value = 0.089). The difference in earnings surprises in Q5 
and Q1 are insignificant in quarters t+2, t+3 and t+4. The result suggests that institutional 
trading prior to supplier earnings is a mechanism driving joint owner trading profits, and 
the institutional trading profits documented in this study are potentially derived by an 
ability to predict future supplier earnings by studying customer-supplier relationships and 
identifying how changes in customer contracts, economically linked firm fundamentals, 
and revealed information about supply chain nuances will impact supplier fundamentals. 
Therefore, the informational advantage along the supply chain obtained by institutions 
with joint ownership is potentially due to joint owners’ ability to more accurately forecast 
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future supplier earnings based on information attained from analyzing the supplier’s 
economic relationships.
17
 
Multivariate Analyses 
  The calendar time portfolio methodology is a practical strategy for identifying the 
returns to each institution trading in supplier stock; however a multivariate approach 
provides the opportunity to control for other factors that have been linked to abnormal 
performance.  Using a multivariate analysis I find that my prior analysis is robust to other 
determinants of stock returns. For each institution-firm-quarter observation, I implement 
Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of quarterly abnormal returns following 
quarterly changes in individual joint owner holdings in each particular stock. The 
abnormal returns are calculated by subtracting DGTW benchmarks from raw returns in 
each DGTW benchmark portfolio and aggregating over three months. The cross-sectional 
regressions are run for each quarter from the first quarter of 1986 to the last quarter of 
2010. The variables of interest, Change and Discrete Change, are variables that represent 
the quarterly change in institutional holdings in the stock. Change is the quarterly 
percentage change in institutional holdings and Discrete Change is the discrete quintile 
rank (1 to 5) of the quarterly percentage change in institutional holdings in the stock. 
The institutional trading profits associated with joint ownership of customer-
supplier linked firms are robust to the multivariate analysis reported in Table 9. As  
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 These results might also suggest that superior supplier forecasts by analysts that cover customer and 
supplier linked pairs identified by Guan, Wong, and Zhang (2014) is a function of attention to 
information externalities from customers to suppliers, and is evidence of familiarity with the supply chain 
relationships, which provides analysts with superior information about how suppliers are impacted by 
fluctuations in demand for their goods or services. 
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Table 9. Multivariate Test of Institutional Trading and Supplier Abnormal Returns 
This table shows Fama-MacBeth regressions of quarterly DGTW benchmark adjusted supplier returns following quarterly changes in joint owner institutional holdings. 
Cross-section regressions are run for each quarter from Q1 of 1986 to Q4 of 2010. The results reflect the full sample of quarterly changes in joint owner institutional 
holdings. Change represents the quarterly percentage change in institutional holdings in the stock and Discrete Change is the discrete quintile rank (1 to 5) of the 
quarterly percentage change in institutional holdings in the stock. Age is the log of the number of months since the firm is listed in CRSP. Price is the log of the stock 
price at the end of month t. Dividend Yield is the log of the cash dividend for the fiscal year ended before the most recent June 30 divided by the market capitalization as 
of December 31 in that fiscal year. Volatility is the log of the variance of monthly returns over months t-23 to t. Turnover is log of the total trading volume divided by 
shares outstanding. Institution Size is the log of the dollar value of equity under management by the institution. P-values are in parentheses and significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Change 0.4349*** 
 
0.4450*** 
 
0.3407** 
 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.012) 
 Discrete Change 
 
0.0013*** 
 
0.0014*** 
 
0.0060** 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.014) 
Price -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0057 -0.0029 
 
(0.841) (0.842) (0.768) (0.765) (0.361) (0.634) 
Dividend Yield 0.0980 0.0971 0.1075 0.1070 0.1439 0.1751 
 
(0.697) (0.700) (0.662) (0.663) (0.657) (0.594) 
Volatility 0.1072 0.1082 0.0942 0.0952 -0.0616 -0.0373 
 
(0.284) (0.280) (0.331) (0.326) (0.646) (0.792) 
Turnover 0.0463 0.0460 0.0472 0.0470 0.0350 0.0451 
 
(0.302) (0.305) (0.293) (0.296) (0.552) (0.494) 
Institution Size 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0113 -0.0100 
  
 
(0.905) (0.898) (0.601) (0.657) 
  Constant -0.0136 -0.0175 0.1726 0.1446 0.0167 -0.0124 
 
(0.591) (0.493) (0.651) (0.710) (0.537) (0.666) 
       
Obs Level 
Institution- 
Firm-Quarter 
Institution- 
Firm-Quarter 
Institution- 
Firm-Quarter 
Institution- 
Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter Firm-Quarter 
Institution Fixed 
Effects 
no no yes yes no no 
Observations 640,972 640,972 640,972 640,972 7,450 7,450 
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reported in Column (1) of Table 9, on average, a 1% change in joint owner holdings 
yields a 0.435% (P-value = 0.002) DGTW benchmark adjusted return in the supplier 
stock over the subsequent quarter. This result is not driven by the tails of the distribution 
of the Change variable, because the coefficient on Discrete Change in Column (2) is also 
positive and significant. The Discrete Change variable controls for the outliers in the 
Change variable, because Discrete Change is the discrete quintile rank of the Change 
variable. Moreover, the positive relation between the change in joint owner holdings and 
future returns is not clustered in a subset of institutions. The return predictability of a 
change in institutional holdings is robust to controlling for institution fixed effects and 
aggregating the change in joint owner holdings at the firm-quarter level. These results are 
consistent with the previously identified profitability of joint owner trading in supplier 
stock.  
Table 10 present the final test of this study in which I partition the sample of 
quarterly institutional trading observations into two groups: Transient joint owners and 
dedicated joint owners. I identify transient and dedicated institutions according to the 
Bushee (2001) classifications. Transient institutions have diversified portfolios with low 
portfolio turnover and are characterized as institutions with short investment horizons. 
Dedicated institutions have concentrated portfolio holdings with relatively low turnover 
and are characterized as institutions with long investment horizons. Since joint owner 
trading predicts abnormal stock returns and earnings news at supplier firms over the 
subsequent quarter, but the predictability does not persist over the long-run I would  
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Table 10. Multivariate Test of Transient and Dedicated Joint Owner Trading and Supplier Abnormal Returns 
This table shows Fama-MacBeth regressions of quarterly DGTW benchmark adjusted supplier returns following 
quarterly changes in joint owner holdings. Cross-section regressions are run for each quarter from Q1 of 1986 to Q4 of 
2010. The results in Panel A (Panel B) are limited to quarterly changes in transient (dedicated) joint owner institutional 
holdings according to the Bushee (2001) classifications. Change represents the quarterly percentage change in 
institutional holdings in the stock and Discrete Change is the discrete quintile rank (1 to 5) of the quarterly percentage 
change in institutional holdings in the stock. Age is the log of the number of months since the firm is listed in CRSP. 
Price is the log of the stock price at the end of month t. Dividend Yield is the log of the cash dividend for the fiscal year 
ended before the most recent June 30 divided by the market capitalization as of December 31 in that fiscal year. 
Volatility is the log of the variance of monthly returns over months t-23 to t. Turnover is log of the total trading volume 
divided by shares outstanding. Institution Size is the log of the dollar value of equity under management by the 
institution. P-values are in parentheses and significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Transient Institutions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Change 0.5252*** 
 
0.5832*** 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
 Discrete Change 
 
0.0014*** 
 
0.0016*** 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
Price -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0008 
 
(0.938) (0.944) (0.896) (0.892) 
Dividend Yield 0.1256 0.1233 0.1296 0.1276 
 
(0.630) (0.636) (0.608) (0.614) 
Volatility 0.1122 0.1143 0.1051 0.1065 
 
(0.279) (0.272) (0.292) (0.287) 
Turnover 0.0528 0.0523 0.0513 0.0511 
 
(0.250) (0.255) (0.259) (0.262) 
Institution Size 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0126 -0.0075 
 
(0.775) (0.800) (0.886) (0.932) 
Constant -0.0211 -0.0253 0.3568 0.2652 
 
(0.434) (0.352) (0.815) (0.863) 
     Institution Fixed Effects no no yes yes 
Observations 601,620 601,620 601,620 601,620 
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Table 10. Continued. 
 
 
 
expect that the results of this study are driven by transient joint owner trades more than 
dedicated joint owner trades.  
Following the same Fama-MacBeth regression methodology I explore the 
disproportional effect of joint owner trading on future returns, by transient and dedicated 
institutions. I find that joint owner trades by transient institutions are much more 
profitable than joint owner trades by dedicated institutions. A 1% change in holdings by 
transient institutions yields a 0.525% (P-value = 0.004) abnormal return in supplier stock 
Panel B: Dedicated Institutions       
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Change 2.5083 
 
-1.0720 
 
 
(0.395) 
 
(0.880) 
 Discrete Change 
 
0.0001 
 
0.0004 
  
(0.978) 
 
(0.811) 
Price -0.0027 -0.0039 -0.0029 -0.0047 
 
(0.656) (0.499) (0.623) (0.428) 
Dividend Yield -0.1581 -0.2322 -0.1335 -0.0879 
 
(0.551) (0.444) (0.688) (0.777) 
Volatility -0.0512 -0.0786 -0.1013 -0.0889 
 
(0.719) (0.610) (0.525) (0.568) 
Turnover 0.0619 0.0598 0.0773 0.0822 
 
(0.265) (0.266) (0.173) (0.151) 
Institution Size 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0912 -0.0001 
 
(0.868) (0.911) (0.203) (0.989) 
Constant 0.0014 0.0116 1.7224 0.0372 
 
(0.971) (0.759) (0.203) (0.852) 
     Institution Fixed Effects no no yes yes 
Observations 39,352 39,352 39,352 39,352 
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over the subsequent quarter. In contrast, a 1% change in holdings by dedicated 
institutions yields an insignificant 0.2.508% (P-value = 0.395). Transient investors’ 
strong performance in trading across the supply chain is consistent with the Yan and 
Zhang (2009) findings that short-term institutional trading is more predictive of future 
stock returns and earnings surprises than long-term institutional trading. The supply chain 
appears to be a productive environment from which short-term institutions can exert 
effort in information gathering across economic relationships to attain superior trading 
returns.  
In summary, joint owner trading profits are robust to the scrutiny of multivariate 
analysis. By following changes in joint owner holdings over the subsequent quarter I 
observe a direct relationship between joint owner trading and future returns. It seems as 
though joint owners look to extract information from complex customer-supplier 
relationships that provides them with an informational advantage over other market 
participants.    
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
Several papers have shown that shocks to a firm have impacts on economically 
connected firms (Menzly and Ozbas, 2010; Cohen and Fazzini, 2008; Pandit, Wasley and 
Zach, 2011). In particular, the ripple effect from shocks to customer firms impacts linked 
supplier firms with a lag. The prevailing explanation for this short-term price inefficiency 
is investor limited attention. Recently research has suggested that attentive corporate 
insiders and sell-side analysts who cover both customer and supplier firms incorporate 
information about the customer-supplier relationship into their supplier trades and 
estimates more rapidly than their peers (Alldredge and Cicero, 2014; Guan, Wong, and 
Zhang, 2014). The focus of this study is to investigate whether institutional managers are 
able to see through the complex customer-supplier relationships and exploit supply-chain 
information through trading. 
In aggregate, institutions modestly profit from trade in supplier stock.  However, 
institutional trading profits are not uniform across all institutions. I find a stark contrast 
between institutional supplier trading profits for institutions that own customer stock (i.e. 
joint owners) and those that do not own customer stock. Joint owners attain sizable 
supplier stock trading profits (1.13% per month), especially when their ownership in the 
customer stock is large (1.14% per month). I identify that joint owner trading profits are 
driven by trading in supplier firms with high customer-base concentration (1.59% per 
month). Further, I find that the joint owner trading profits are not due to related industry 
concentration, but are attributable, at least in part, to superior information gathering about 
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supplier earnings based on captured information from the supply chain. Therefore, 
information gathered from the customer-supplier relationship helps joint owners identify 
changes in future supplier revenues which benefits joint owner trading decisions.  
This paper provides a new look into the determinants of institutional ownership and 
informed institutional trading. I reveal the propensity for institutions to own a customer 
or supplier if they already own a stake in the corresponding linked supplier or customer.  
Ownership of a corresponding linked firm is an otherwise undocumented determinant of 
institutional ownership.  Moreover, I provide evidence of how economies of scale in 
information gathering along the supply chain leads to profitable institutional trading. This 
paper shows that the extraction of information about customer-base concentration from 
complex customer-supplier relationships generates an opportunity for institutions to 
anticipate changes in supplier earnings and profitably trade on their superior information.
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